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5 
FROM ACT PSYCHOLOGY TO 
PROBABILISTIC 
FUNCTIONALISM: THE PLACE OF 
EGON BRUNSWIK IN THE 
HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY* 
DAVIDE. LEARY 
In the coming years, Egon Brunswik will hold an ever increasingly 
significant and important position in the history of psychology. 
(from Edward C. Tolman's eulogy, 1956) 
Despite Tolman's prediction, Egon Brunswik's place in the history of psy-
chology has yet to be firmly established. Although his name and his con-
cepts are frequently invoked, they are rarely used in defense of positions 
that he would have recognized as his own. And although most contem-
porary psychologists have failed to comprehend either the details or the 
underlying rationale of his psychological theory, historians of psychology 
have done even less to clarify the context, development, and import of 
his life and work.' 
This neglect is unfortunate. Brunswik deserves much greater attention, 
not only because he was one of the major twentieth-century theorists on 
the psychology of perception, or because he was unusually prescient 
about later developments in psychology, but because his life and work 
constitute an extremely useful case history for the study of a variety of 
*This chapter is based on a much larger study of Egon Brunswik's life and work, which was 
partially supported by grants from the History of Psychology Foundation and the National 
Science Foundation. Different versions have been presented to the American Psycholog-
ical Association, the Department of Psychology at the University of California at Berkeley, 
and Cheiron: The International Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sci-
ences. I thank Kenneth R. Hammond for the invitation that m1tiated this research project; 
Marion White McPherson, John Popplestone, and John Miller of the Archives of the His-
tory of American Psychology, Akron, Oh10, for their help in locatmg materials relevant to 
this project; and the many former colleagues and students ofBrunswik who shared letters, 
lecture notes, and memories of Brunswik. I also thank David Devonis for his assistance 
in drafting the two diagrams used in this chapter. I dedicate this essay to Leonard Kneger, 
in gratitude for his guidance of my first attempts to understand the German-language psy-
chology of the past. 
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critical historical issues, including topics of interest to both intellectual 
and social historians. 
My primary concern in this chapter will be the conceptual and meth-
odological development of Brunswik's psychology over the course of his 
career and in the context of his migration from Vienna to Berkeley. With-
out discussing the individual doctrines of his psychological system in 
extensive detail, I will describe its basic foundations and the historical 
sequence by which it was constructed. In doing so, I will show how Brun-
swik's psychology was based on a very unusual blending of intellectual 
and scientific traditions. 
In addition to reviewing the foundations and historical development 
of Brunswik's psychology, I will also review its historical impact and con-
sider why it has not been more influential. In the course of this analysis 
I will discuss some factors intrinsic to his psychology, the significance of 
his migration from Europe to the United States, and the means by which 
he tried to disseminate his ideas. Together with the preceding analysis of 
his psychology, these considerations should help us understand why 
Brunswik's legacy remains undefined over thirty years after Tolman's 
eulogistic prediction. 
AN OVERVIEW OF BRUNSWIK'S CAREER 
Egon Brunswik was born in Budapest on March 18, 1903. From the age 
of eight he was educated in the best schools in Vienna. Then, in 1923, 
after two years as an engineering student, he transferred to the University 
of Vienna where he began to study psychology under Karl Buhler. At the 
time Buhler was one of the foremost psychologists in the world. In the 
exciting atmosphere of Buhler's Psychological Institute, Brunswik was 
immediately swept into his newfound discipline and became an active 
participant in Btihler's famous Wednesday evening discussion group. 
As if this were not stimulation enough, Brunswik was soon a frequent 
participant in a Thursday evening discussion group held by Professor 
Moritz Schlick. During the years of Brunswik's participation this group 
was the seedbed from which the Vienna Circle of logical positivists 
emerged, and for the rest of his career Brunswik maintained personal, 
professional, and intellectual ties with the logical positivists and with the 
Unity of Science Movement that grew out of logical positivism. So from 
the very beginning of his career, we can see the formation of distinctive 
philosophical as well as psychological interests. The integration of these 
interests became an implicit goal of Brunswik's lifework. 
Brunswik received his PhD in psychology in 1927, and he immediately 
became an assistant in Btihler's Institute. For the next seven years, with 
the exception of a year spent teaching in Ankara, Turkey, Brunswik 
directed research at the Psychological Institute and continued his own 
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research in the area of perception. In 1934 he published a major book, 
Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt, which was based on his research of 
the preceding seven years. At the same time he became an associate pro-
fessor, and soon thereafter he was invited by Edward C. Tolman to spend 
the 1935-36 academic year as a visiting lecturer and research fellow at 
the University of California, Berkeley. This mvitation came as the result 
of a sabbatical that Tolman spent in Vienna m 1933-34. During this sab-
batical he and Brunswik discovered that their psychological ideas were 
quite compatible and even complementary- so much so that the 47-year-
old Tolman and 30-year-old Brunswik had co-authored an important the-
oretical article entitled "The Organism and the Causal Texture of the 
Environment."2 
Brunswik's one-year stay in Berkeley was apparently mutually satisfac-
tory, for in 1937, after an intervening year in Vienna, Brunswik returned 
to Berkeley as an assistant professor. He remained at Berkeley, advancing 
through the academic ranks, until his untimely death in 1955. Thus his 
career at Berkeley coincided almost exactly with the classical period in 
that department's history. During this time Brunswik was widely 
acknowledged to be, in essence, the department's intellectual conscience. 
His deep scholarship and meticulous research provided an exacting 
model of intellectual and methodological integrity for several generations 
of students and faculty. 
THE FOURFOLD BASIS OF BRUNSWIK'S PSYCHOLOGY 
This brief chronology has alluded to three primary bases of Brunswik's 
psychology, namely, the European functionalist tradition, represented by 
Buhler; the logical positivist movement, generated by and around 
Schlick; and American neo-behaviorism, as set forth by Tolman. The sec-
ond and third of these bases - the positivist and behavionst traditions -
served to modify and extend the first. In turn, the psychology constructed 
on all three of these bases was extended and modified during Brunswik's 
years in the United States by a fourth and final tradition - the Anglo-
American statistical tradition. As embodied in a succession of research 
assistants, such as Rheem Jarrett and Robert Rollin, this tradition helped 
Brunswik articulate a more sophisticated methodology for his emerging 
psychological system. With the elaboration of this methodology, Brun-
swik's psychology reached its mature form in the decade before his death. 
The most important factor in the development of Brunswik's psychol-
ogy was clearly the first of the four traditions I have pomted out - the 
European functionalist tradition as advanced by Karl Buhler and 
amended, as we will see, under the influence of Fritz Heider. 
The ancestry of Biihler's psychology extended back through Oswald 
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Kiilpe, his mentor at Wilrzburg, to Franz Brentano, the founder of so-
called act psychology. The fundamental postulate of Brentano's psychol-
ogy is well known, even if the scope of its impact is not. The basic fact 
about psychological activities, according to Brentano, is that they always 
include a reference to some object. Consciousness, to take the most gen-
eral case, is always consciousness of something. The practical result of 
this basic postulate was the dissolution of the philosophically worrisome 
dualism of subject and object, or knower and known. Killpe, Bi.ihler and 
others accepted this postulate as a basic statement of a functional, or rela-
tional, theory of mind. 3 
Btihler's contribution consisted in pointing out and providing experi-
mental corroboration of the fact that the fundamental unity of subject 
and object is not so definitive that each and every aspect of the object-
world is related to one and only one psychic experience. Quite the con-
trary, in his groundbreaking studies in Gestalt psychology, he showed 
that the relationship between particular aspects of the object-world (sen-
sations) and the experiential awareness of the subject (perception) is fun-
damentally ambiguous. Any given sensory stimulus, he showed, will be 
perceived differently when placed against a different contextual back-
ground.4 Furthermore, Buhler found that the same principle could be 
applied in the study of language: no word has a single fixed meaning; 
rather, all words receive their meaning from the sentence and paragraph 
in which they are embedded. Any given word can mean several or more 
things, depending on the context in which it is uttered. Thus, the hearer 
of language must interpret - must infer the probable meaning of a word 
- based on the word's relation to its linguistic setting. This interpretation 
by the hearer is, of course, usually unconscious. 
Over several decades, based on such research, Buhler formulated his 
well-known principle of "representation" - a principle he applied to all 
psychological phenomena, but most explicitly to language. Words, Buhler 
maintained, represent things or thoughts; they are not the things or 
thoughts themselves. Just as words can have different meanings and thus 
represent different objects, so too can objects be represented by different 
words. There is, in other words, no invariant one-to-one relationship 
between representations or signs (whether these be perceptual cues or 
words) and the things they represent. 5 
This was the state of affairs when Brunswik became Biihler's student 
in 1923. He soon began to follow up on Buhler's previous work on per-
ception, and in particular on perceptual constancy. The influence of 
Buhler on Brunswik was profound and lasting. Between 1927 and 1929 
Brunswik confirmed and extended Biihler's previous research, showing 
that perception is not a simple function of sensation, that there are fun-
damental ambiguities in stimulus information, and that the perceiver can 
and usually does learn to resolve most of these ambiguities in a fairly 
Egon Brunswik and the history of psychology 119 
stable and reliable fashion. As a basic premise in all this work, Brunswik 
accepted Bi.ihler's notion of perception as a subject-object relationship.6 
Then, in 1929, Brunswik read Fritz Heider's paper on "Ding und 
Medium," and his thinking took a significant step forward. Heider, as a 
student of Alexi us Meinong, was a member of the same functionalist tra-
dition extending back to Brentano.7 Not surprisingly, his article corrob-
orated the relational framework Brunswik had inherited from Bi.ihler. 
However, it also directed Brunswik's attention more forcefully toward 
the object side of the subject-object continuum. It did so by pointing out 
that most objects are not in immediate contact with the subject; rather, 
they are separated from the subject by a "medium" through which per-
ception has to be achieved. The real issue for the psychology of percep-
tion, Brunswik came to see, was how the subject could use "proximal" 
(immediate) sensory cues to infer the nature of the "distal" (distant) 
objects that these cues represent. From this point on, Brunswik referred 
to his psychology as a "psychology in terms of the object." By this he 
meant that it was the task of psychology to determine how and to what 
degree individuals establish veridical contact with the world of objects. 
In his subsequent work, Brunswik understood proximal sensations (stim-
uli impinging directly on the sense organs) as representations of certain 
aspects of the distal object world, and he sought to discover how it is that 
perceivers achieve perceptions of objects on the basis of these represen-
tative sensory cues.8 
At this point in the development of his psychological system, Brun-
swik's affiliation with the logical positivist group had a significant impact 
on his work. The impact was somewhat paradoxical. To date he had 
accepted the general conceptual framework of the European functionalist 
tradition and had begun to articulate his own distinctive version of func-
tionalist theory, but he had not yet been converted to the probabilist 
assumptions that were to characterize his mature psychology. He came 
to accept these assumptions - and here is the paradox - through his alle-
giance to the logical positivist movement, and, specifically, as a result of 
a grave challenge posed by this movement to his Btihlerian heritage. 
To understand this, we must recall that one of the major doctrines of 
the Vienna Circle was a theory of meaning and truth that was based on 
the contention that scientific language should and could be reducible to 
invariant sense-data referents. 9 Each term of scientific discourse, they 
claimed, must have one and only one sense datum (or set of sense data) 
as a referent. The problem...was that Brunswik had corroborated Bi.ihler's 
finding that the relationship between sense data and their objects - or 
between words and their referents - is fundamentally ambiguous, that is, 
uncertain. Not surprisingly, this contradiction between the epistemolog-
ical premises of the Vienna Circle and the empirical results of his own 
experiments created an intellectual crisis for Brunswik, who was equally 
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attracted to both of the ventures - philosophical and psychological - in 
which he was a privileged participant. 
Brunswik resolved this tension through the discovery of the work of 
Hans Reichenbach, the leader of the Berlin school of logical positivists, 
who proposed a probabilistic theory of human knowledge in opposition 
to the Vienna Circle's stipulative and nomothetic approach. 10 This theory 
allowed Brunswik to resolve the fundamental conflict between his psy-
chological.findings and his desire to achieve a philosophically sound psy-
chological theory. Utilizing Reichenbach's argument that all human 
knowledge is probabilistic, Brunswik was able to rationalize the ambig-
uous relationship between sensory cues and their objective referents by 
speaking of this relationship as probabilistic in nature. In principle, he 
was able to argue, objects can be perceived and therefore known only 
probabilistically. There is no one-to-one relationship between sense data 
and the objective world, nor can there be a one-to-one relationship 
between sense data and language, as the Vienna Circle claimed at that 
time. 
Because Reichenbach was so widely respected among members of the 
Vienna Circle, Brunswik was thus able to maintain his allegiance to the 
general logical positivist movement while also remaining true to the 
premises and results of his psychological research. At the same time, the 
self-conscious designation of functional relations as probabilistic in prin-
ciple - and not simply in relation to our imperfect means of knowing 
about such relations - constituted a major step towards his eventual sys-
tem of "probabilistic functionalism." 
The next state in the development of Brunswik's psychology occurred 
under the influence of the American behaviorist Edward C. Tolman, who 
corroborated the logical positivist insistence on objectivistic methodol-
ogy, and particularly on verifiable, physicalistic measurements. This 
insistence led Brunswik - ironically, in view of Tolman's own use of 
"intervening variables" - to begin thinking in terms of a "psychology 
without an organism." As a result, the subjective pole in the functional 
relationship between the subject and object receded from Brunswik's psy-
chology for more than a decade. 11 
Tolman also stimulated Brunswik to broaden his psychological system 
to include behavioral as well as perceptual events. In this regard Brun-
swik had an equally important reciprocal influence on Tolman, who 
simultaneously expanded the scope of his psychological metatheory to 
treat sensation and perception more specifically than before. These 
mutual influences were first explicated in their classic article on "The 
Organism and the Causal Texture of the Environment." 
At the beginning of this article Tolman and Brunswik noted that they 
had composed their joint publication because they discovered that "our 
previous separate investigations had led us quite independently of one 
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another to a common point of view as to the general nature of psychol-
ogy." Indeed, the parallels in their "common point of view" were remark-
able. These resulted, they said, from a shared vision of psychology as 
"primarily concerned with the methods of response of the organism to 
two characteristic features of the environment" - first, that the environ-
ment is a "causal texture" in which different events are regularly (but not 
invariably) linked with one another and, second, that these "causal cou-
plings," because they are not absolutely invariant, are in any given 
instance "to some degree equivocal" or uncertain. The first characteristic, 
the regular linkages between different environmental events, had led each 
of them to the conclusion that certain events can serve as "signs" (Tol-
man) or "cues" (Brunswik) or "local representatives" (Tolman and Brun-
swik) from which other events or entities or goal states could be inferred 
and responded to, either behaviorally or perceptually. The second char-
acteristic, that "local representatives" are "not connected in simply one-
one univocal ... fashion" with these represented events, entities, and 
goal states, had led them to emphasize the significance of the "differing 
frequencies" - the relative probabilities - that characterize these relations 
and, therefore, characterize the "attainment" of behavioral "ends" (Tol-
man) and of perceptual "objects" (Brunswik). 12 
In other words, Tolman and Brunswik had independently arrived at 
the conviction that organisms operate on the basis of "hypotheses" that 
have "only a certain probability of being valid." Whether it is a rat trying 
to reach the food chamber ofa T-maze (Tolman) or a human being trying 
to estimate the actual size of a distant object (Brunswik), the organism 
acts to achieve its distant goals by means of the immediate "signs" or 
"cues" at its disposal, and it continually adjusts its assumptions about 
the referents of these "local representives" on the basis of ongoing expe-
rience. The organism's task, Tolman and Brunswik said, "is to correct 
whatever hypotheses it brings with it to fit the real probabilities of the 
actually presented setup." 13 
At this point two diagrams will help clarify and summarize the basic 
structure of Brunswik's perceptual theory and the expanded metapsy-
chology that he produced together with Tolman. Under the impact of 
Reider's notion of mediated perception, Brunswik had developed what 
he called a "lens model" of perception (see Figure 5-1). The illustration 
of this model crystallizes the core of Brunswik's perceptual theory. 14 
According to Brunswik's lens model, the distal object occasions various 
proximal sensations in the peripheral senses of the organism. These 
peripheral senses serve as a "lens" that collects the various cues and 
directs them to a central "focal point" where they are selectively utilized 
by the organism in the production of a "central response." In the typical 
Brunswikian experiment, this response was a visual perception of an 
object's size, objectively measured by the subject's verbal estimate of the 
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Figure 5-1. Bunswik's lens model of perception. 
object's actual size. The degree of veridical accuracy of a given perception 
was, for Brunswik, the measure of its achievement, or what he later called 
its "functional validity." 
The organism's perceptual achievements, according to Brunswik, 
depend on the selective use of an array of cues. In the course of experi-
ence, the organism learns that some cues are more likely than others to 
represent a given dimension of the external world. As a result, the organ-
ism places greater trust in these cues. (In Brunswik's later terminology, it 
comes to realize that these cues have greater "ecological validity," and it 
therefore gives them preeminence in its "hierarchy of cues.") However, 
since the relation between the organism and its environment is never 
completely static, the organism's expectations about the validity of cues 
are never absolutely certain and are continually subject to revision. 
An expanded lens model can be used to represent the broadening of 
Brunswik's psychology that took place in collaboration with Tolman (see 
Figure 5-2). The extended portion of this model is a symmetrical, mirror 
image of the earlier model. On the new "motor" side of the diagram, an 
array of habits - alternate behaviors leading to any given goal - take the 
place of the hierarchy of cues on the sensory side of the model. Each 
potential behavior - each of the means at the organism's disposal - has 
a differential probability ofleading to the intended goal. As in perception, 
the organism's behavioral responses are guided by hypotheses regarding 
the probable success of each of these alternative means. And again, the 
achievement of the organism's ends - for instance, the reaching of a food 
chamber in a T-maze - can be objectively measured. For the phenomena 




Figure 5-2. Extension of the lens model to behavior. 
represented by this side of the diagram, Tolman's research on purposive 
behavior served as the prototypic illustration. 15 
Although their own investigations up to the mid-l 930s had focused on 
a more restricted set of topics, Brunswik and Tolman concluded their 
classic article with the suggestion that 
all the problems of psychology - not only those of visual percep-
tion and oflearning - but all the more general problems of instinct, 
insight, learning, intelligence, motivation, personality, and emotion 
all center around this one general feature of the given organism's 
abilities and tendencies for adjusting to these actual causal textures 
- these actual probabilities as to causal couplings. 16 
Thus, by the time he came to the United States in 1935, Brunswik had 
developed a distinctive theory of perception and had extended that the-
ory, in collaboration with Tolman, to cover - at least in principle - the 
entire domain of psychology. But a theory, however comprehensive in 
scope, is one thing; a fully articulated psychology with an appropriate 
methodology and an adequate stock of data is something else. Up to this 
point Brunswik's research had concentrated almost exclusively on 
selected topics in the psychology of perception, and in this research he 
had utilized relatively unsophisticated modes of quantitative analysis. 
For instance, he used simple ratios, comparing estimated to actual object 
size, as a gauge of the accuracy of perception. This was an effective way 
to describe the phenomena of size constancy, which was the. typical ex per-
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imental problem that he and his students studied, but in the United 
States Brunswik was soon exposed to much more powerful ways of inter-
preting his data. In good part through his interaction with a series of grad-
uate assistants, Brunswik came to realize that his psychological theory 
could be expressed and tested much more persuasively through the lan-
guage and use of correlation statistics. 
Although the addition of statistical means of analysis may seem a triv-
ial amendment of Brunswik's psychology, it was actually quite signifi-
cant, for in matching his theoretical commitment to probabilism with a 
methodological commitment to probability-based analytical techniques, 
Brunswik completed the interlacing of a conceptual and methodological 
foundation on which he was now prepared to erect his mature system of 
probabilistic functionalism. 
BRUNSWIK'S PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISM 
During his one-year stay in Berkeley in 1935-36, prior to his permanent 
move to the United States in 1937, Brunswik started to redeem his claim 
that behavioral as well as perceptual phenomena are probabilistic in 
nature. In a study of "Probability as a Determiner of Rat Behavior," 
Brunswik investigated behavioral-response learning in the context of 
varying probabilities of reward (or "goal achievement"), a context which 
as he said was more representative of "the natural environment of a liv-
ing being" than the all-or-none reward schedules used in previous behav-
ioral studies. When it was published in 1939, this study was noteworthy 
for its use of partial reinforcement and for being the first publication in 
which Brunswik applied correlation statistics. 17 
From this point on, Brunswik's distinctive approach to the study and 
understanding of psychological phenomena - and his realization of its 
far-reaching implications - unfolded at a rapid pace. Returning to the 
area of perception, he extended his use of correlation statistics in "Thing 
Constancy as Measured by Correlation Coefficients," published in 1940. 
This study advanced Brunswik's investigation of size constancy, dem-
onstrating through a complex set of correlations that perceivers utilize 
sensory cues of relatively low degrees of reliability- having nowhere near 
one-to-one correspondence to reality- in the process of attaining remark-
ably high degrees of veridical perception (or "object achievement"). In 
other words, this study showed that the overarching functional relation 
between subject and object - the correlation between "central responses" 
and "distal objects" - was much greater than the correlation between 
"mediating proximal cues" and "distal objects." The clear implication 
was that perceivers make inferences about the object-world that go 
beyond the information provided by cues apparently on the basis of past 
experience with similarly ambiguous cues and distant objects. 18 
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As important as this study was, it still relied on traditional experimen-
tal procedures. However, even before this study was in print, Brunswik 
realized that his psychological premises demanded a much more radical 
departure from traditional modes of investigation, and he set about 
designing a study of perceptual size constancy that would take place in a 
natural environment rather than a laboratory. Furthermore, instead of 
randomly varying subjects in this study, as was and still remains the stan-
dard procedure in experimental psychology, Brunswik opted to investi-
gate the perceptions of only one individual across a variety of real-life 
situations, allowing the objects to be perceived to be randomly selected 
according to their chance occurrence in the subject's perceptual field at 
any given time. 19 
Clearly this was a radically new way of doing psychological research, 
and not surprisingly it aroused attention and debate among psychologists. 
In fact, as a result of a major address by Brunswik at the Sixth Interna-
tional Congress for the Unity of Science in 1941, the debate was under 
way long before he published his monograph-length report on this project 
in 1944. The original antagonists in this debate were Clark Hull and Kurt 
Lewin, Brunswik's distinguished co-symposiasts at the Congress. Their 
critical comments, published in 1943 along with Brunswik's address, 
started a controversy that continued throughout the final decade of Brun-
swik's life. 20 
We are already familiar with the fundamental notions underlying the 
position Brunswik advocated in his address, which he titled "Organismic 
Achievement and Environmental Probability." As we have seen, these 
notions were rooted deeply in Brunswik's intellectual history, but he 
expressed them now more forcefully than ever before. As in his classic 
article with Tolman, Brunswik emphasized that organismic achievement 
involves either the perception of distal objects or the attaining of behav-
ioral goals, that the cues and means that facilitate perceptual and behav-
ioral achievements are always "ambiguous," and that therefore the 
achievement of veridical perception and of behavioral goals is always to 
a certain degree probabilistic. Furthermore, Brunswik argued that such 
achievements are the result of the organism's "focusing" on distal objects 
and goals, albeit through the media of cues and means. This focusing of 
the organism on the ends of psychological processes - on distal objects 
and goals rather than on proximal cues and means - warrants, Brunswik 
said, a "molar" approach to psychological investigation. In other words, 
the primary concern of a functionalist psychology should be the correla-
tion of the organism's perceptions and behaviors with their targeted 
objects and objectives, not the designation of less probable and replace-
able "molecular" events. 
To this molar functionalism Brunswik now added a thoroughgoing sta-
tistical probabilism. Psychology, he said, 
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as long as it wishes to deal with the vitally relevant molar aspects of 
adjustment and achievement, has to become statistical throughout, 
instead of being statistical where it seems hopeless to be otherwise, 
and cherishing the nomothetic ideals of traditional experimental 
psychology as far as relationships between geographic stimulus vari-
ables and response variables are concerned. 21 
This was the challenge to which Brunswik's critics responded most vocif-
erously. They realized that granting Brunswik's contentions would neces-
sitate "the extension of such an instrument as correlation statistics from 
individual differences to stimulus-response relationships," the "represen-
tative sampling" of both perceptual objects and behavioral objectives, 
and the acceptance of statistical generalizations as the ultimate type of 
regularity that can be discovered by psychology.22 For if the objects of 
perception and the objectives of behavior are the proper concerns of a 
functionalist or molar psychology, and if these objects and goals vary as 
much as - or even more than - the organisms that achieve them, then it 
is as important to sample the population of relevant natural objects and 
goals as it is to sample the population ofrelevant organisms - and for one 
and the same reason, so that individual differences among objects and 
goals can be taken into consideration, just as individual differences 
among organisms must be taken into consideration, in a properly statis-
tical, which is to say, a thoroughly probabilistic analysis. Only then can 
psychologists make the kind of generalizations - statistical generaliza-
tions - that are worthy of a truly functionalist psychology. 
The critical response to these contentions illustrated both the misun-
derstanding and the resistance that were to plague Brunswik in his 
remaining years. Clark Hull's critique can serve as an exemplar. After 
setting up a contrast between probability and natural law, he argued that 
"scientific theory is concerned with natural laws. These are conceived as 
being uniform. Do such isolable uniformities exist in the field of behav-
ior? . . . Lewin and I believe they do; Brunswik, on the other hand, is 
convinced that no such uniformities exist."23 The confirmation of one or 
the other of these beliefs, Hull said, must await "prolonged effort directed 
specifically to this task" of discovering uniform natural laws. Brunswik, 
he implied, had given up the quest as hopeless before he had devoted 
adequate effort to the "laborious and time-consuming" task at hand. In 
any case, even an ideal science like physics must accept certain errors of 
measurement that are bound to occur because "it is impossible to know 
the exact conditions" surrounding a given phenomenon. As a result, even 
in physics empirical correlations among phenomena are bound to be less 
than 1.00. It should not be surprising, then, if correlations in psychology 
are less than perfect. Even more than in physics "we always lack abso-
lutely exact knowledge concerning [the] conditions" surrounding psycho-
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logical phenomena. But this does not mean that psychologists are 
doomed to live with probability rather than natural law, any more than 
it means that physicists are. 24 
Hull's response showed how much he "cherished the nomothetic ideals 
of traditional experimental psychology," as Brunswik had put it. It also 
showed a fundamental confusion that Brunswik had to suffer for the rest 
of his life. Brunswik was not concerned that "we" who observe someone 
else's behavior cannot make precise predictions because "we" lack com-
plete information about the organism's environmental conditions; rather, 
as he put it in a later publication, Brunswik was convinced that "so long 
as the organism does not develop, or fails in a given context to utilize 
completely, the powers of a fullfledged physicist observer and analyst, his 
environment remains for all practical purposes a semierratic medium [for 
him]; it is no more than partially controlled and no more than probabil-
istically predictable" from the point of view of the organism; and it is the 
organism that must respond on the basis of its own, necessarily proba-
bilistic knowledge.25 
To give Hull his due, this rejoinder relies on an aspect of Brunswik's 
thought that had been de-emphasized - even suppressed - since 1934, 
when he had chosen to develop a "psychology without an organism." I 
am referring to the cognitive role of the subject in the subject-object rela-
tionship that formed the basic foundation of his approach. Under the 
influence of the logical positivist and behavioral movements, Brunswik 
had rejected the use of "intervening variables" and the study of media-
tional processes as a valid concern for a "psychology in terms of the 
object." But it is not easy to shuck basic aspects of a system of thought, 
and the later elaboration of his system demanded the resurrection of its 
"missing dimension." 
Interestingly, Hull sensed the inconsistency of Brunswik's critique of 
intervening variables, or as Hull called them, "symbolic constructs," and 
he noted that Brunswik himself seemed "at certain moments at least to 
introduce perception as a variable intervening between the physical stim-
ulation of his subjects and their verbal responses. " 26 A glance at the lens 
model diagrams that portray the basic structure ofBrunswik's theory (see 
Figures 5-1 and 5-2) confirms what Hull said. Even ifBrunswik preferred 
to focus on organismic achievements, he had to admit that the achieve-
ments depended on some sort of mediational processes that he had rep-
resented, however schematically, in this model. In his desire to remain 
as objectivistic as possible, however, he had renounced further discussion 
of these processes. But his whole point about the organism actively cal-
culating its own behavior, actively responding according to its own per-
ceptual and behavioral expectations - its "hypotheses" about the objects, 
events, and possibilities in its environment - implicated a ·recognition of 
the organism as a cognizing subject. 
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Whether in response to Hull's point or not, Brunswik began in the early 
1940s to reinsert into his research a distinction he used years before in 
Vienna, a distinction between "perception" and "thinking," or more spe-
cifically, between the kind of cognition that occurs when a subject is in a 
relaxed, uncritical mental attitude and the kind of cognition that occurs 
when a subject is in a "betting" or calculating mental attitude. He also 
began to think of the organism as "an intuitive statistician" that routinely 
makes probabilistic inferences about its surrounding environment with-
out being self-conscious about it, and he became one of the first psychol-
ogists to note the relevance of cybernetics and communications theory 
for psychology, well before the wholesale revival of cognitivism in 
psychology.27 
Still, Brunswik was clearly uncomfortable speculating about organ-
ismic processes, and it was not until he could offer a "statistical separa-
tion of perception, thinking, and attitude" in 1946 that he became more 
comfortable with this aspect of his metatheory.28 Although his "statistical 
separation" was not adopted by other researchers, he continued to elab-
orate his "ratiomorphic models of perception," for which he was subse-
quently designated a forerunner of the cognitive movement in psychol-
ogy. Fittingly, one of the last pieces that he completed before his death 
was a posthumously published paper on the "Scope and Aspects of the 
Cognitive Problem." True to his original functionalist insight, he con-
cluded this paper by saying that "only by detailed analysis of ecological 
[i.e., environmental] textures can the cognitive problem be restored from 
mere utilization problems [regarding how organisms use cues and means] 
to its full scope of achievement problems and thus again become the key 
to the core problem of psychology, that of the adjustment of the organism 
to a complex environment."29 For Brunswik the cognitive problem, like 
all other psychological problems, had to be approached within the con-
text of the primary relationship between subject and object - between the 
organism and its environment. 
Whether or not Hull's critique sparked Brunswik's reassertion of the 
organism's role in psychological dynamics, it did provide an incentive for 
a longer, more formal statement about probabilistic functionalism. Brun-
swik made that statement in 194 7 in a monograph entitled Systematic 
and Representative Design of Psychological Experiments. 30 This treatise, 
one of the most remarkable works in twentieth-century psychology, is 
properly considered Brunswik's major manifesto. However, it is remem-
bered primarily for its critique of traditional psychology and for various 
of its concepts that have been borrowed and used in other contexts. It has 
rarely been used as Brunswik intended - as a blueprint for a method-
ological revolution in psychology. 
The central distinction that Brunswik drew in this work was between 
the "systematic" and "representative" design of psychological experi-
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ments. In the systematic experiments typical of experimental psychology, 
Brunswik said, the organisms that serve as the subjects of investigation 
are sampled because their idiosyncratic characteristics cannot be sepa-
rated and controlled, and their responses are then treated statistically so 
that generalizations can be made to other organisms that did not partic-
ipate in the experiment. However, the environmental stimulus variables 
used in systematic experiments are typically separated and controlled to 
keep them constant or independent of one another, irrespective of how 
they covary, probabilistically, in the natural environment of the organism 
under investigation. As a result, many of these variables are artificially 
"tied" during the course of the experiment, and this "unnatural covar-
iation of independent variables" destroys the grounds for logical infer-
ences about the generalizability of experimental results. Consequently, it 
should not be surprising that generalizations from systematic experi-
ments tend to break down across a variety of natural environments, just 
as they would for other organisms if the subject population had not been 
adequately sampled. In representative design, on the other hand, stimu-
lus conditions would not be "unnaturally covaried," but would be sam-
pled representatively just as subjects are in traditional experiments. Then 
the same logic of induction and the same statistical procedures could be 
performed on situational variables as are now performed on responses, 
and a thoroughgoing probabilism would establish psychology as a science 
of properly general results. 
Rightly or not, Brunswik's arguments did not stimulate sustained 
attention, much less the conversion of large numbers of psychologists. In 
the absence of such success, Brunswik tried a different mode of publica-
tion. After many years of work, he completed and published his long-
overdue historical treatise on The Conceptual Framework of Psychology 
in 1952.31 This brilliant, if eccentric, work shows that Brunswik was not 
only a psychologist and philosopher of science; he was also a preeminent 
historian of psychology. Though his historical account is what we might 
call "presentistic" in that it leads inevitably up to his own probabilistic 
functionalism, his historical analyses are both profound and provocative, 
and they convey the rich historical context in which Brunswik situated 
his own work. Still, although it contributed to his reputation, Brunswik's 
monograph did not convert many psychologists to his point of view. 
In July 1953, at the Berkeley Conference for the Unity of Science, 
Brunswik made his last major attempt to explain and defend probabilistic 
functionalism. Subsequently published in May 1955, Brunswik's exposi-
tion and reply to his critics - specifically to Herbert Feig!, Ernest R. Hil-
gard, David Krech, and Leo Postman - was literally his last stand.32 Two 
months after its appearance, he committed suicide. Alth<:rngh ill health 
and several other factors were important incentives, there is little doubt 
that his final act was the tragic consequence of his deep depression over 
130 PSYCHOLOGY IN 20TH-CENTURY THOUGHT & SOCIETY 
his inability to convince his contemporaries that what he had to say was 
of fundamental importance. 
BRUNSWICK'S LEGACY 
No major psychologist fails to have some effect on the course of psy-
chology, and by any account Egon Brunswik was a major psychologist. 
Still, the situation at the time of his death was pathetic. Kenneth Ham-
mond, a former student of Brunswik recalled that 
During the spring of 1954 [a year before Brunswik's death], I visited 
Brunswik in his office at Berkeley .... During the visit, Brunswik 
opened a file drawer and showed me two folders - one labeled Ham-
mond, the other, Smedslund - and with unmistakable pride indi-
cated that there were now two psychologists who were doing Brun-
swikian research .... Apparently there was no one else. 33 
But Hammond persevered, and over the years the number oflegitimately 
called Brunswikians has grown. It is still a relatively small body of 
researchers, but they form an active and dedicated group with remarkably 
diverse interests, covering the entire range of topics falling between the 
end-terms in Brunswik's double-lens model (see Figure 5-2). According 
to Hammond's count, 
Over 200 studies have been carried out within the Brunswikian 
framework since 1964 [up to 1980]. They include numerous studies 
of clinical judgment; multiple-cue probability learning, which pro-
duced the concepts of cognitive feedback in contrast to conven-
tional outcome feedback, as well as cognitive control, and cognitive 
skill; studies of interpersonal learning and interpersonal conflict; the 
effects of psychotherapeutic drugs on all of these processes; inter-
active judgment analysis that provides immediate cognitive feed-
back regarding judgments, and thus makes it possible to apply the 
Brunswikian tradition to the study of policy formation, policy 
implementation, and the study of expert judgment, as well as ani-
mal behavior. 34 
It is symptomatic that Hammond's count of Brunswikian research 
begins in 1964, almost a decade after Brunswik's death. Before and even 
after that time, most of the influence that might be accorded to Brunswik 
has been of a more general sort, or of such a specific type that it does not 
constitute the benefactor a Brunswikian in any exacting sense. But even 
in these cases, the influence has sometimes been quite significant. Donald 
Campbell may serve as a prime example. Although his work has followed 
its own trajectory, he acknowledges that its distinctive thrust has come 
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from the early inspiration he received as a student and assistant of Brun-
swik at Berkeley. This inspiration, Campbell has written, was focused "at 
the levels of general perspective and of stating the problems which psy-
chology must face." Furthermore, although Campbell has not been able 
to follow Brunswik on many points that Brunswik regarded as important, 
Brunswik's "stand" on such matters has served as "a major reference 
point" in Campbell's clarification of his own, different position. Beyond 
that, Campbell notes that his "total indebtedness to [Brunswik] is hard 
to estimate, since I learned from him primarily through lectures and con-
versations." He illustrates this point by reviewing several "discoveries" 
he made years after leaving Berkeley, only to find out later - when review-
ing class notes from Brunswik's courses - that he had heard about these 
discoveries long before he made them. 35 Many other Berkeley students 
say the same thing.36 
The list of those who were inspired by Brunswik in general, but mean-
ingful ways could be extended to include those whose relation to Brun-
swik was mediated through his publications rather than through personal 
contact. Roger Barker and Jerome Bruner are only two of many well-
known psychologists who have acknowledged some sort of "distal" debt 
to Brunswik - for general or partial inspiration rather than for his psy-
chology as a whole. Similarly, references to Brunswik can be found scat-
tered throughout the literature of recent decades on methodology, learn-
ing, thinking, decision processes, perception, communication, and 
psychological ecology. In addition, probabilism and the basic metaphor 
of the mind as an intuitive statistician have been gaining in popularity. 
But in most of the cases where Brunswik's work is cited as a precedent, 
it is generally a fairly routine citation, meant to confer a sense of author-
ity and legitimacy to current theory and practice rather than to acknowl-
edge an actual intellectual debt. As Herbert Simon has noted, Brunswik 
was a forerunner of a number of developments, but "did not, in fact, have 
much influence on what developed." 37 
Influence is an elusive thing. Even to corroborate some new develop-
ments - to serve as a legitimizing reference - is not without its signifi-
cance. But it is clearly not what .Brunswik had in mind. Given his gen-
erally acknowledged brilliance, why has so much of Brunswik's 
"influence" been of this nebulous, unfocused sort? And why have so 
many psychologists been uninfluenced by Brunswik, even in this rather 
generously construed form? 
Even if Brunswik was properly understood - and this was frequently 
not the case - a number of reasons internal to his psychology help 
account for his limited, ambiguous legacy. Perhaps the major reason is 
that it is virtually impossible to implement Brunswik's. methodology 
without some qualification. Even Brunswik never attempted, much less 
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accomplished, a completely Brunswikian study. His groundbreaking 
1944 monograph on "Distal Focussing of Perception" was only "a meth-
odological demonstration" of his approach, not a fully realized study 
based on representative design. As Brunswik himself admitted, he had 
not scrutinized the situational generality of this study's results, nor had 
he checked the representativeness of the subject's choices of objects to be 
perceived. 38 
Demonstration or not, however, this study took a great deal of effort 
beyond that demanded by a typical laboratory experiment, and so it did 
not help his case - at least for those who were reading closely - when 
Brunswik noted that "the general trend and proportion of results" in 
more traditional experiments "is quite similar to those of the present 
study." As a result, he conceded, "the major results of our study may 
seem commonplace. A checkup of this kind is, however, a methodologi-
cal requirement."39 If in fact Brunswik's admittedly more cumbersome 
approach confirmed the general results of much simpler laboratory exper-
iments, it was certainly not clear that the extra effort was necessary, 
except perhaps as an occasional "checkup" on the validity of experimen-
tal methodology. 
The other major study that might seem to qualify as a definitive appli-
cation of Brunswik's methodology is the second part of Perception and 
the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments, entitled "Per-
ception: The Ecological Generality of its Distal Aim." This was Brun-
swik's final, summary treatment of his research on the psychology of per-
ception. But in the Preface to this work, written just five months before 
his death, Brunswik admitted that it had become increasingly clear to 
him that "hybrid designs combining features of both systematic and rep-
resentative deisgn are likely to contiriue and even to increase in frequency 
within the near future"; and in fact his own research in this study 
reflected this move toward "such an intermediate area."40 
Beyond the practical difficulties that led to this sort of methodological 
compromise were emotional and intellectual difficulties that had to be 
faced. It may seem odd to speak of emotional difficulties when consid-
ering the application of scientific method, but in this case, as in others, 
emotional factors seem to have played a very tangible role. In the 1940s 
and early 1950s the nomothetic ideal of discovering universal and abso-
lute natural laws through the use of carefully controlled experiments was 
deeply ingrained in the cultural ethos of the scientific community. Per-
haps nothing, other than complete intellectual and methodological anar-
chy, could have been so threatening to that community - and especially 
to the self-conscious subculture of scientific psychology - as Brunswik's 
espousal of a thoroughgoing probabilism combined with his radical cri-
tique of experimentalism. How difficult it could be to deal with Brun-
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swik's probabilistic functionalism is poignantly conveyed by Brunswik's 
own confession: 
The present writer has in himself experienced the required shift of 
emphasis as very slow going and hard to maintain, especially so far 
as consistent concrete application is concerned. The difficulties he 
encountered . . . have given him the impression of resistances 
approaching in intensity those encountered in the opening up of 
emotionally highly loaded topics, such as those dealt with in 
psychoanalysis. 41 
And so: 
It takes a certain courage, a neglect of some of the attitudes sacred 
to scientific tradition, to give up the safety of molecular correlations, 
cheap as they are, in favor of the equivocalities or "vaguenesses" of 
molar correlations. But we have to prefer vagueness focused upon 
essentials to security and strict univocality focussed upon non-
essentials.42 
Brunswik was not exaggerating his own personal difficulty. For some-
one as rationalistic as he was, it had taken an enormous amount of cour-
age to follow the path he felt compelled to take. He did not want proba-
bilistic "explanations" of psychological phenomena; rather, psychological 
phenomena - it seemed to him - demanded such treatment, in total dis-
regard of his temperamental inclinations.43 But, as we have seen, Brun-
swik's realization of this need for a thoroughgoing probabilistic function-
alism took many years to develop and grew out of a unique interplay of 
intellectual and scientific traditions. Perhaps he should not have expected 
others, who had the benefit of neither the same amount of time nor the 
same intellectual context, to respond in the affirmative when he called for 
fundamental change in psychology. In addition to all else, he was making 
this call during one of the most self-assured and dogmatic periods in psy-
chology's history. It was hardly a time when the dice were loaded in his 
favor. 
Such factors account for some of the obstacles that Brunswik's psy-
chology faced: His methods were "formidable"; his theory was "at vari-
ance with the more traditional notions"; and his probabilism was bound 
to elicit some "emotional resistance."44 We might be satisfied with them 
as an explanation for Brunswik's clouded legacy except that so many psy-
chologists seemed not to understand his methodological, theoretical, and 
probabilistic convictions. They did not reject Brunswik's psychology for 
emotional or even clearly defined intellectual reasons. They simply let it 
slip by, in ignorance of its meaning and import. These psychologists 
include not only those who lived beyond Brunswik's orbit, but also many 
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of his own students and colleagues. Here is the rub: Why have so many 
people simply not understood what Brunswik was saying? Why did Don-
ald Campbell have to write in 1954 that "too few of us Berkeley students 
got what [Brunswik] had to say," even after attending his lectures and 
working with him as teaching and research assistants?45 It is hardly sur-
prising that others have failed to understand Brunswik's message if his 
own students and colleagues have admitted a considerable degree of 
incomprehension. 
Derivation, Migration, Dissemination: Situating Brunswik in 
the History of Psychology 
Three interrelated factors have contributed significantly to the misunder-
standing and incomprehension from which Brunswik's psychology has 
suffered. These factors are, first, the constitution of Brunswik's psychol-
ogy; second, the effects of Brunswik's move to the United States; and, 
third, the ways in which Brunswik tried to communicate his psychology. 
Brunswik's psychology, as we have seen, was derived from a unique 
blend of intellectual and scientific traditions. The functionalist premises 
that Brunswik received from the European act-psychology tradition and 
the probabilist assumptions that he derived from a branch of the logical 
positivist movement were far from familiar to the majority of American 
psychologists. In addition, Brunswik's application of the statistical tools 
of differential psychology to the traditional subject matter of experimen-
tal psychology clashed with the mindset of American psychologists who 
had come to think of differential and experimental psychology as two 
quite distinct "disciplines" within psychology.46 
The upshot, in colloquial terms, was that most American psychologists 
had difficulty understanding where Brunswik was coming from. At the 
same time most European psychologists, until the Anglo-American sta-
tistical tradition made greater inroads on the Continent in the 1960s and 
1970s, had trouble comprehending, and so were not persuaded by, Brun-
swik's mature system of probabilistic functionalism. 
In referring to the American and European situations I have already 
trespassed on my second point, that Brunswik's migration from Vienna 
to Berkeley affected more than the final theoretical articulation of his psy-
chology. In making the move to the United States, Brunswik lost an audi-
ence that shared much of his intellectual background, the aid ofa number 
of talented and committed research assistants, and a professional context 
in which perception was seen as an important and attractive research 
problem. In the United States during the 1940s and early 1950s, percep-
tion was not a highly regarded research topic and did not attract the num-
ber of able young investigators that it had in Vienna. As a result, despite 
the general influence he had on many students, Brunswik never played 
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the active role in directing student research that he had enjoyed previ-
ously in Vienna. In all his years at Berkeley, he directed only four doc-
toral dissertations. Even Kenneth Hammond, his one true "disciple" at 
Berkeley, did not do his major research under Brunswik's direction. This 
loss of an institutional basis for a large-scale research program made it 
difficult for Brunswik to implement his theoretical insights as quickly and 
completely as he would have liked. As a result, he left behind much less 
research and fewer disciples than he might have in a more supportive 
context.47 
The third factor I want to consider is Brunswik's style of communica-
tion - the means by which he sought to disseminate his ideas. I have not 
yet emphasized the number of important theoretical papers that Brun-
swik presented at philosophical conferences and published in philosoph-
ical journals. Never cutting his tie to the logical positivist and subsequent 
Unity of Science movements, Brunswik continued to scrutinize his psy-
chological theory and methods - and to invite scrutiny - from the point 
of view of philosophical analysis. Although some American psycholo-
gists, such as Tolman and Hull, had peripheral associations with these 
movements, the majority of American psychologists were insulated from 
them and were therefore insulated from a certain number of Brunswik's 
important theoretical presentations. 48 
In addition, as mentioned previously in the brief discussion of his Con-
ceptual Framework of Psychology, Brunswik was a careful student of the 
history of psychology, and he used his distinctive historical analyses to 
provide a context for explaining and defending his own probabilistic 
functionalism. Although his publications in this area were few in number, 
Brunswik frequently utilized historical analysis in his teaching, and his 
history of psychology course was one of the major means of communi-
cating his approach to many Berkeley students. Unfortunately, there is 
evidence that these students were unprepared to profit from these anal-
yses and hence missed the opportunity to learn what Brunswik was trying 
to convey.49 
Matters were not helped by the fact that Brunswik was such a widely 
read scholar who continually referred to new developments in other sci-
ences and disciplines that might have some significance for psychology. 
Many students heard for the first time about cybernetics, communica-
tions theory, econometrics, open system thermodynamics, biological sys-
tems theory, time series analysis and other developments in Brunswik's 
courses. His enthusiastic discussions of how these developments might 
be of service to psychologists were not always matched by the students' 
ability to follow what he was talking about.5° 
If the channels of communication that Brunswik used and the content 
of what he had to say often extended beyond the ken of his students and 
of most psychologists, Brunswik's writing style did little to balance the 
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situation. In lectures and in personal conversation he was more expan-
sive, which was often a problem in its own right, especially when his lis-
teners were unable to follow the connections he would make. But in his 
writings, Brunswik's style was brutally precise, succinct, and demanding. 
As Tolman put it, Brunswik "was never willing to oversimplify or restrict 
the actual complexities of the relationships with which he was concerned. 
This always makes the reading of whatever he wrote a difficult task but 
an exciting and stimulating challenge [at least for the sympathetic 
Tolman]."51 
Perhaps the scale of difficulty is best conveyed by the "good news" and 
"bad news" comments made by Julian Hochberg and Gustav Bergmann 
on Brunswik's Conceptual Framework of Psychology. Hochberg noted 
that a "decrease in Brunswik's customary condensation [in this book] 
makes for an increase in ease of reading." True, but the increase in ease 
was relative to Brunswik's own austere standard, as indicated by Berg-
mann's assessment that "physically this is a slim volume, hardly a book, 
rather, a monograph of barely a hundred pages. Intellectually this is the 
equivalent of three books or, to put it conservatively, of one well-sized 
book and two monographs of about one hundred pages each."52 
There is no question that the style of Brunswik's communication - his 
uncompromising efforts to say things just right and just once - had a del-
eterious effect on the understanding of his message. 53 Few readers were 
able to muster the time and effort to enjoy the "exciting and stimulating 
challenge" that Tolman promised. Those few who did - for instance, 
Robert Leeper - were likely to ftnd Brunswik's work "more impressive 
and persuasive" with prolonged study. But as Leeper himself noted, "in 
an age like ours, where rapid reading is praised, his [work] is altogether 
unsuited to the mode of approach that most readers would tend to 
bring. " 54 In other words, it was not likely that many readers would choose 
to slowly and laboriously decode Brunswik's full message, and they have 
not. Instead many have turned to Brunswik's work for brief periods of 
time and have taken away this or that piece of his message, either igno-
rant or uncaring about the larger, systematic context from which that 
piece was removed. 
Where does that leave us - or rather, where does it leave Brunswik? It 
is too soon to say what place he may be assigned in the larger sweep of 
the history of psychology, but in his own period of time, as I have tried 
to show, he was clearly situated at a number of crossroads - between var-
ious intellectual and scientific traditions (European functionalism, logical 
positivism, American behaviorism, and Anglo-American statisticalism), 
between various cultures and national traditions (European and Ameri-
can) and between various modes of scholarly endeavor (philosophical, 
historical and scientific). 
Perhaps because he was situated at so many crossroads, Brunswik was 
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more sensitive than most psychologists to the directions in which psy-
chology was going. It may seem odd to suggest that Brunswik, the pro-
ponent of such a distinctive system, was representative of mid-twentieth-
century psychology, but it is nevertheless the case that his system repre-
sented many of the major trends that have emerged more clearly into 
view in the years since Brunswik's death. Brunswik foresaw and advo-
cated the emergence of probabilism, psychological ecology, perception, 
and cognition as key areas of psychological interest, increased scrutiny of 
the validity and reliability of psychological knowledge, greater historical 
and philosophical awareness, and the recognition of the "inextricable 
entanglement" of theory and method.ss Brunswik was more than a weath-
ervane, but he was that par excellence. If he did not create the weather 
patterns, he had an uncanny sense of which way the fresh breezes were 
blowing. Against the gales of opinion, he sought to give the breezes their 
due attention. 
Edwin G. Boring, as the editor of Contemporary Psychology, appended 
the following quotation from John Morley to a 1957 review ofBrunswik's 
posthumous Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological 
Experiments: 
There are some books which cannot be adequately reviewed for 
twenty or thirty years after they come out.s6 
In this instance at least, I believe that Boring was more prophetic than 
Tolman, whom I quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Thirty years 
after Brunswik's death, the time does seem ripe for more adequate 
reviews of Brunswik's life and works. I hope that this chapter will serve 
as a helpful starting point. 
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